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Abstract
We investigate how to model the beliefs of an agent who be-
comes more aware. We use the framework of Halpern and
Reˆgo (2013) by adding probability, and define a notion of a
model transition that describes constraints on how, if an agent
becomes aware of a new formula ϕ in state s of a model M ,
she transitions to state s∗ in a model M∗. We then discuss
how such a model can be applied to information disclosure.
1 Introduction
Agents must sometimes take actions in situations that
they do not fully comprehend. Work in computer
science, economics, and philosophy has sought to
capture this formally by considering agents who are
unaware of some aspects of the world. (See, e.g.,
(Fagin and Halpern 1988; Halpern and Reˆgo 2013;
Modica and Rustichini 1994; Modica and Rustichini 1999;
Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2006; Board and Chung 2009;
Sillari 2008).) Most work on awareness thus far has focused
on the static case, where awareness does not change. The
focus of this paper is the dynamic case: how to how to
model the beliefs of an agent who becomes more aware.
When there is no unawareness, the standard approach
to dealing with beliefs is well understood; we update by
conditioning. However, it is far from clear how beliefs
should change when an agent becomes aware of new fea-
tures. For example, a mathematician who becomes aware
of the Riemann hypothesis, but learns nothing beyond that,
may change his methods of proof and his beliefs about what
is true, despite not having learned that any particular event
has obtained. When an agent becomes more aware, his en-
tire (subjective) view may change. In this paper, we propose
a model for the dynamics of increased awareness for agents
who are introspective, and so can reason about their own and
other’s awareness (and lack of it).
We work with a probabilistic extension of the framework
of Halpern and Reˆgo (2013) where agents understand that
they themselves may be unaware of some propositions, but
cannot directly reason about or articulate such propositions.
Instead the agents consider states (possible worlds) that con-
tain shadow propositions—proxies that represent an agent’s
vague conception of those propositions of which he is un-
aware. We define a notion of a model transition that de-
scribes constraints on how, if an agent becomes aware of a
new formula ϕ in state s of a model M , she transitions to
state s∗ in a modelM∗. When an agent becomes aware of a
formula that she was previously unaware of, she associates
the novel propositions with shadow propositions she previ-
ously considered. The states of the updated model resem-
ble the original states except that some shadow propositions
may be replaced by the novel propositions contained in the
newly discovered formula.
The transition rule allows uncertainty to both increase
(because the agent can be uncertain about how to inter-
pret the new propositions) and decrease (because by making
a discovery, the agent learns about his own unawareness).
This is in contrast to reverse Bayesianism which, roughly
speaking, requires that if the agent is aware of both ψ and
ψ′, and becomes aware of ϕ, then his assessment regard-
ing the relative likelihood of ψ and ψ′ should not change
(Karni and Vierø 2013). Karni and Vierø’s requirement does
not seem appropriate for many situations of interest, es-
pecially for introspective agents, who may believe that the
mere existence of ϕ is itself informative about the world—
so becoming aware of ϕ changes beliefs about other propo-
sitions.
For example, suppose that agent i believes it is very likely
that he is fully aware and observes j taking questionable ac-
tions. He might then reasonably believe that agent j is not
rational. But then suppose that i becomes aware of some
fact ϕ of which he was not previously aware. Since he now
acknowledges that he did not fully understand the situation,
i considers it more likely that j can rationalize his behav-
ior. Hence, simply by becoming aware of ϕ, i changes his
assessment of j being rational.
We then discuss how such a model can be applied to infor-
mation disclosure. Many economic models predict volun-
tary disclosure due to strategic concerns (because no news is
interpreted as bad news). For example, consider restaurant
health code inspections, which rate restaurants on a scale
of A-F. Surely, an A restaurant would display the rating in
the window, so a rational and fully aware patron who sees
a restaurant without a rating can assume that the restaurant
does not have an A rating. But then, B restaurants would
want their rating to be known, rather than having patrons
wonder where in the B to F range they fall; hence B restau-
rants will also post their ratings. Continuing inductively, it
follows that all restaurants will disclose their ratings (except
possible those with an F). Economists have used such analy-
ses to conclude that many types of financial disclosures will
be made voluntarily, so regulation is not needed.
However, when agents might be unaware of the rating
system, this analysis clearly fails. An agent unaware of the
rating system can draw no conclusion whatsoever from the
lack of a rating. Since disclosure might not only provide
information but also expand awareness, belief and behavior
might change in subtle ways. For example, we show that
whether a restaurateur discloses a rating is determined by
his beliefs about how patrons will interpret the rating if they
were unaware of the system. In particular, if the restaurateur
believes that patrons view a posted grade as arising from a
binary pass-fail system, then the B restaurant might with-
hold its rating, despite B objectively being an above-average
rating.
More generally, there is a growing experimen-
tal literature suggesting that subjects often fail to
properly reason about hypothetical or counterfac-
tual events, and thus deviate from the predictions of
rational (and omniscient) agents; see, for example,
(Esponda and Vespa 2014; John, Barasz, and Norton 2016;
Cox, Serva´tka, and Vadovicˇ 2017;
Jin, Luca, and Martin 2018). Such deviations need not
result from wholesale irrationality, but could arise from
subjects’ unawareness of the relevant counterfactuals, for
example, being unaware of the actions an opponent could
have taken but did not. Our model provides a framework
for considering unawareness in a strategic setting, and in
particular, about the effect of agents’ beliefs about other
agents’ reactions to becoming more aware.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
2 introduces the syntax and semantics of our static proposi-
tional logic. We extend this model to a dynamic environment
in Section 3. The key definition is of a transition rule, which
captures how a model can change when an agent becomes
aware of a new formula. Section 4 shows how thinking in
terms of transition rules can be helpful in making predic-
tions in economic environments of information disclosure,
where one agent can strategically decide to make another
agent aware of a new formula. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 A (Static) Propositional Logic of
Awareness and Probabilistic Beliefs
In this section, we introduce a propositional logic of aware-
ness and probability that essentially combines ideas from the
propositional logic of awareness introduced by Halpern and
Reˆgo (2013) (henceforth HR13) and the logic of knowledge
and probability introduced by Fagin and Halpern (1994)
(henceforth FH94). The syntax of the logic is as follows:
given a set {1, . . . , n} of agents, formulas are formed by
starting with a countably infinite set Φ = {p1, p2, . . .} of
primitive propositions and a countably infinite set X of
variables, and then closing off under conjunction (∧), nega-
tion (¬), the modal operators Ai, Xi, i = 1, . . . , n, likeli-
hood formulas of the form a1ℓi(ϕ1) + · · · + akℓi(ϕk) > b,
where a1, . . . , ak, b are rational numbers, and quantification,
so that if ϕ is a formula, then so is ∀xϕ.
Some comments on the syntax: Following Fagin and
Halpern (1988), Xi denotes explicit knowledge (or belief);
Xiϕ is true if, in addition to ϕ being true in all states that
i considers possible, i is aware of ϕ. We capture aware-
ness using the Ai modality; Aiϕ means that i is aware of
ϕ. Awareness is syntactic, so i may be aware of p1 but not
aware of p1 ∧ (p2 ∨ ¬p2). In this paper, we assume for sim-
plicity that awareness is generated by primitive propositions
(an assumption that goes back to Fagin and Halpern (1988)),
so that an agent is aware of a formula iff he is aware of all
the primitive propositions in the formula). Following HR13,
we use quantification to capture knowledge of unawareness.
For example, the formula Xi(∃x¬Ai(x)) says that agent i
(explicitly) knows that there is a formula that he is unaware
of. (As usual, ∃xϕ is an abbreviation for ¬∀x¬ϕ.) The ℓi in
a likelihood formula can be interpreted as probability, so a
formula such as a1ℓi(ϕ1)+ a2ℓi(ϕ2) > b says that a1 times
the probability of ϕ1 plus a2 times the probability of ϕ2 is
at least b. Call this language L∀,X,ℓ,An (Φ).
As in first-order logic, we can define inductively what it
means for a variable x to be free in a formula ϕ. Intuitively,
an occurrence of a variable is free in a formula if it is not
bound by a quantifier. A formula that contains no free vari-
ables is called a sentence. If ψ is a formula, let ϕ[x/ψ]
denote the formula that results by replacing all free occur-
rences of the variable x in ϕ by ψ. (If there is no free occur-
rence of x in ϕ, then ϕ[x/ψ] = ϕ.) Unlike standard quan-
tified modal logic, where the quantifiers range over propo-
sitions (intuitively, sets of states), following HR13, here the
quantifiers range over quantifier-free sentences. Thus, ∀xϕ
is true iff ϕ[x/ψ] is true for all quantifier-free sentences ψ.
Roughly speaking, we want quantification to range over for-
mulas, since Ai is syntactic. However, it cannot range over
all formulas, since, for example, the formula ∀x(x) would
then be true iff all formulas (including itself) were true, and
we would not be able to get a recursive definition of truth.
We avoid these difficulties by taking the domain of quan-
tification to be the quantifier-free sentences. (See HR13 for
further discussion of these syntactic constraints.)
We give semantics to these formulas in probabilistic
awareness structures. Given Φ, let Φ+ consist of Φ together
with an infinite set Φ′ = {q1, q2, . . .} (disjoint from Φ) of
special primitive propositions that we call shadow proposi-
tions; we explain their role below. A probabilistic awareness
structure for n agents (over Φ+) is a tupleM = (S, π, K1,
. . ., Kn, A1, . . . , An,PR1, . . . ,PRn,L) satisfying the
following properties:
• S is a set of states (or possible worlds), which we take to
be finite for simplicity.
• π : S×Φ+ → {true, false} determines which primitive
propositions in Φ+ are true at each state in S.
• Ki is a binary relation on S for each agent i = 1, . . . , n,
which for this paper we take to be Euclidean (if (s1, s2) ∈
Ki and (s1, s3) ∈ Ki, then (s2, s3) ∈ Ki), transitive,
and serial (for all states s, there exists a state s′ such that
(s, s′) ∈ Ki).
• PRi associates with each state s a probability on the
states in Ki(s) = {s′ : (s, s′) ∈ Ki}, where all sub-
sets of Ki(s) are taken to be measurable and PRi(s′) =
PRi(s) if s
′ ∈ Ki(s).
• Ai is a function associating a set of propositionswith each
state in S, for i = 1, ..., n such that if s′ ∈ Ki(s), then
Ai(s) = Ai(s′).
• L associates with each state s a subset of Φ+; we require
that (∪ni=1Ai(s)) ⊆ L(s) and that if s
′ ∈ Ki(s), then
L(s′) ⊆ Ai(s) ∪Φ
′.
Intuitively, if (s, s′) ∈ Ki, then agent i considers state s′
possible at s. The assumption that Ki is Euclidean, tran-
sitive, and serial means that the Ki operator satisfies the
axioms of KD45 traditionally associated with the logic of
belief (see (Fagin et al. 1995) for more discussion).1 Ai(s)
is the set of primitive propositions that agent i is aware of
at state s. It is more standard to take Ai(s) to be the set of
all formulas that i is aware of at world s. We are assuming
here that awareness is generated by primitive propositions
(Fagin and Halpern 1988); agent i is aware of a formulaϕ if
i is aware of all the primitive propositions in ϕ. Thus, it suf-
fices to take Ai(s) to consist only of primitive propositions.
The fact that Ai(s′) = A(s) if s′ ∈ Ki(s) means that an
agent knows what he is aware of; similarly, the assumption
that PR(s′) = PR(s) if s′ ∈ Ki(s) means that an agent
knows his beliefs.
Intuitively, L(s) is the language associated with state s.
We certainly want the language to include all the primitive
propositions that some agent is aware of at state s, but pos-
sibly others as well. For example, if agent i knows at state s
that there is a formula that no agent is aware of (which can be
expressed asXi(∃x(¬A1(x)∧ . . .∧¬An(x))), then at each
state s′ that he considers possible, the language must in-
clude a primitive proposition not in ∪nj=1Aj(s). Moreover,
as noted by HR13, we must allow different languages at dif-
ferent worlds to deal with the possibility that agent i might
be unsure of whether he is aware of all formulas (which can
be expressed as ¬Xi¬(∃x¬Ai(x)) ∧ ¬Xi¬(∀x(Ai(x)))).
In this case, there must be states s′ and s′′ in Ki(s) such
that L(s′) = Ai(s) and L(s
′′) ⊃ Ai(s) (where ⊃ denotes
strict superset). If s′ ∈ Ki(s), then we think of the primi-
tive propositions in L(s′)−Ai(s) as “shadow propositions”.
Agent i understands that they must exist, at some level, but
since i is not aware of them, he does not really understand
what they denote. Thus, we require that L(s′) consist of
the “real” primitive propositions that i is aware of and pos-
sibly some shadow propositions. HR13 did not distinguish
real and shadow propositions. Making the distinction has
no effect on their axioms involving awareness, but we find
it conceptually useful, especially to discuss belief dynamics
in the next section. However, it is worth noting that this re-
quirement means that, in general, Ki will not be reflexive.
If L(s) contains real primitive propositions that agent i is
unaware of, then we cannot have s ∈ Ki(s).
We now define what it means for a formula to be true at
a state s in a probabilistic awareness structure M by com-
bining the earlier definitions of FH94 and HR13. We take
1As is often done, we blur the distinction between knowledge
and belief in this discussion.
L∀,X,ℓ,An (s) to consist of the formulas all of whose primi-
tive propositions are in L(s). For a formula ϕ let PROP(ϕ)
denote the set of primitive propositions in the formula ϕ.
• (M, s) |= p if p ∈ L(s) and π(s, p) = true;
• (M, s) |= ¬ϕ if ϕ ∈ L∀,X,ℓ,An (s)) and (M, s) 6|= ϕ;
• (M, s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ if (M, s) |= ϕ and (M, s) |= ψ;
• (M, s) |= Aiϕ if PROP(ϕ) ∈ Ai(s);
• (M, s) |= Xiϕ if (M, s) |= Aiϕ and (M, s′) |= ϕ for all
s′ ∈ Ki(s);
• (M, s) |= ∀xϕ if (M, s) |= ϕ[x/ψ] for all quantifier-free
sentences ψ ∈ L∀,X,ℓ,An (s);
• (M, s) |= a1ℓi(ϕ1) + · · · + akℓi(ϕk) > b if
a1PRi(s)([[ϕ1]]M ∩Ki(s))+ · · ·+akPRi(s)([[ϕk]]M ∩
Ki(s)) > b, where [[ϕ]]M = {s′ : (M, s′) |= ϕ}, and
(M, s) |= Ai(ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk).
Example 1. Consider a model with two agents, i and j, and
three states, s1, s2, and s3. L(s1) consists of two proposi-
tions, p and p′, both “real”. In state s1, agent i is unaware
of p′, while j is aware of both. L(s2) = {p, q}, where q is a
shadow proposition. In state s2, agent j is aware of both p
and q, while i is aware only of p. Finally, L(s3) = {p}, and
both agents are aware of p in state s3. Ki(sk) = {s2, s3}
andKj(sk) = sk for k = 1, 2, 3.
In state s1, i believes its possible that j is aware of some-
thing he himself is not aware of. However, he can only de-
scribe this state vaguely, envisaging not p′, but the shadow
proposition q. He also considers it possible that he is fully
aware. If p is true at state s2, then i knows that if he is
unaware of something, then p is true.
3 Dynamics
We now turn our attention to how an agent’s beliefs should
be updated when the agent becomes aware of a formula ϕ
of which he was previously unaware.2 As the general case
is notationally complex, to ease exposition, we first consider
the single-agent case. With only a single agent, the main
concern is how the agent interprets the formula he becomes
aware of, and how knowledge and probabilistic reasoning
depend on his interpretation. In the general case, considered
in the next subsection, we also need to deal with the beliefs
of other agents, and with higher-order beliefs.
3.1 Dynamics: The Single-Agent Case
Let L∀,X,ℓ,Ai (Φ) denote the language with a single agent i.
Suppose that in state s in a model M = (S, π, Ki, Ai,
PRi, L), the (single) agent i becomes aware of a formula
ϕ of which he was previously unaware. Our goal is to con-
struct an updated modelM∗ = (S∗, π∗, K∗i , A
∗
i , PR
∗
i ,L
∗)
2Of course, an agent may become aware of ϕ by learning ϕ
(i.e., by learning that ϕ is true). We view this conceptually as the
composition of two updates: the update due to becoming aware of
ϕ, followed by the update due to learning ϕ given that the agent is
aware of ϕ, which can be handled by standard techniques, specifi-
cally, conditioning.
and state s∗ ∈ S∗ that reflects this. Each state inM∗ corre-
sponds to some state in M ; the correspondence is captured
by a relation T . We now explain how T works.
If t is a state such that L(t) has at least as many shadow
propositions that i is unaware of as there are propositions
in ϕ that i is unaware of, then t is consistent with i be-
coming aware of ϕ. Let CONS(M,ϕ, i) ⊆ S denote the
states consistent with i becoming aware of ϕ in model M .
If PRi(s)(CONS(M,ϕ, i)) = 0, then becoming aware of
ϕ was an event to which i previously gave probability 0;
i didn’t consider it possible that there were two primitive
propositions of which he was unaware. In this case, we place
no constraints on how i updates his beliefs; this is analogous
to conditioning on an event of measure 0. (We make precise
below what “no constraints” means.)
If, on the other hand,PRi(s)(CONS(M,ϕ, i)) 6= 0, then
for each t ∈ Ki(s) ∩ CONS(M,ϕ, i), i must decide how
to take ϕ into account at t. For example, suppose that at
a state s where i is unaware of p and p′, i becomes aware
of the formula p ∧ p′. Further suppose that at t ∈ Ki(s),
there are exactly three shadow propositions, q, q′, and q′′,
in L(t). Then i must decide which of q, q′, and q′′ is p and
which is p′; i could in principle decide that none of them
is an appropriate candidate for p (or p′). For example, after
becoming aware of p∧p′, imight consider possible a state t∗
such that (1)L∗(t∗) = L(t)−{q, q′}∪{p, p′}; (2)A∗i (t
∗) =
Ai(s)∪{p, p′} (3) π∗(t∗, r) = π(t, r) if r ∈ L(t)−{q, q′},
π∗(t∗, p) = π(t, q), and π∗(t∗, p′) = π(t, q′). Thus, in t∗, i
has replaced the shadow proposition q ∈ L(t) with p, and q′
with p′. Agent imight also consider possible a state where q′
is replaced by p and q′′ is replaced by p′. Roughly speaking,
in moving fromM toM∗, we want to replace each state t ∈
Ki(s) by some states compatible with t (each of these states
will be related to t by T ) and distribute the probability of t
among these states, and then condition on CONS(M,ϕ, i).
The next definition makes precise the relationship be-
tween related states.
Definition 1. f : Φ+ → Φ+ is a ϕ-replacement scheme
if f is the identity on Φ+ − PROP(ϕ) (where PROP(ϕ) is
the set of propositions in ϕ) and f is injective on PROP(ϕ).
A ϕ-replacement scheme f is compatible with i becoming
aware of ϕ at s if f is the identity on PROP(ϕ) ∩ Ai(s) and
f(PROP(ϕ) − Ai(s)) ⊆ (L(s) ∩ Φ′) − Ai(s). A state s∗
is an f -replacement for s if (1) f(L∗(s∗)) = L(s) and (2)
π∗(s∗, p) = π(s, f(p)) for all p ∈ L(s∗).
Intuitively, a ϕ-replacement scheme for i describes how i
interprets the propositions in ϕ of which he was previously
unaware, associating each with a different (shadow) propo-
sition. That is, f maps each proposition in ϕ that i becomes
aware of to some (unique) shadow proposition that i was
unaware of, and leaves all other propositions alone.
If f(p) = q, then i considers it possible that the shadow
proposition q represents the real proposition p that appears
in ϕ. So as discussed above, if after becoming aware of
p ∧ p′, i considers t∗ where p was represented by q ∈
L(t) and p′ by q′, then t∗ is a f -replacement of t where
f(p) = q, f(p′) = q′, and f is the identity otherwise. If
PRi(s)(CONS(M,ϕ, i)) 6= 0, then the relation T men-
tioned above actually associates each state t∗ ∈ K∗i (s
∗)with
a pair (t, f), where t ∈ Ki(s) and t∗ is an f -replacement of
t compatible with i becmoing aware of ϕ at s.
A situation is a pair (M, s) consisting of a modelM and
a state s inM . Fix a setΦ of primitive propositions and a set
I of agents.3 LetM(I,Φ) and S (I,Φ) consist of all mod-
els and situations, respectively, over the language Φ with
agents in I. Let RS(ϕ, i, s) denote the set of ϕ-replacement
schemes compatible with i becoming aware of ϕ at s, and let
RS(ϕ) = {id} ∪ (∪i,sR(ϕ, i, w)) (where id is the identity
function on Φ+).
The next definition is the one that we have been heading
for. It describes what counts as an acceptable update from
a situation (M, s) to a new situation (M∗, s∗) that is the re-
sult of agent i becoming aware of ϕ. We capture this using
the notion of an acceptable transition rule τ . Formally, a
transition rule τ maps a situation, a formula, and an agent
(for now, necessarily the single agent i) to a new situation,
interpreted as the result of agent i becoming aware of the
formula ϕ when the initial situation was (M, s). (M∗, s∗)
is an acceptable update from a situation (M, s) after agent i
becomes aware of ϕ if τ((M, s), i, ϕ) = (M∗, s∗) for some
acceptable transition rule τ . Although, conceptually, the
ideas behind the definition are quite straightforward, writ-
ing them down carefully results in a complicated definition.
We give some intuition for the details of the definition im-
mediately after the definition, and then provide an example
that illustrates some of them.
Definition 2. τ : S ({i},Φ) × L∀,X,ℓ,Ai (Φ) × {i} →
S ({i},Φ) is an acceptable transition rule for
a single agent if for all (M, s) ∈ S ({i},Φ),
ϕ ∈ L∀,X,ℓ,Ai (Φ) if PROP(ϕ) ∈ L(s), M =
(S, π,Ki,Ai,PRi,L), τ((M, s), ϕ, i) = (M∗, s∗),
and M∗ = (S∗, π∗,K∗1,A
∗
1,PR
∗
1,L
∗), then ei-
ther PROP(ϕ) ⊆ Ai(s) and (M, s) = (M∗, s∗),
or PROP(ϕ) 6⊆ Ai(s) and there exists a relation
T ⊆ S × S∗ × RS(ϕ) such that the following hold:
T1. For all t∗ ∈ S∗, there exists a unique t ∈ S and f such
that (t, t∗, f) ∈ T ; moreover, t∗ is an f -replacement of t.
T2. (s, s∗, id) ∈ T and A∗i (s
∗) = Ai(s) ∪ PROP(ϕ).
T3. If PRi(s)(CONS(M,ϕ, i)) 6= 0, then for all
(t, t∗, f) ∈ T the following conditions hold:
(a) K∗i (t
∗) = {t† : (t′, t†, f ′) ∈ T, for some t′ ∈
Ki(s) ∩ CONS(M,ϕ, i), f ′ ∈ RS(ϕ, i, s)}.
(b) If t′ ∈ Ki(s) ∩ CONS(M,ϕ, i), let
rep(t′) = {t† ∈ K∗i (t
′) : ∃f ′((t′, t†, f ′) ∈
T )}. Then PR∗i (t
∗)(rep(t′)) =
PRi(s)(t
′)/PRi(s)(CONS(M,ϕ, i)).
Note that the conditions in the definition apply only if
PROP(ϕ) ⊆ L(s). State s cannot be the actual world if its
language does not include propositions that appear in a for-
mula that is part of the description of the world. We do not
care what τ does at situations (M, s) that do not describe
3Although this section deals only with the single-agent case, so
I = {i}, we introduce the more general notation for so that we can
use it in later sections.
the world. For situations that describe the world, nothing
changes if i was already aware of all the primitive proposi-
tions in ϕ. If iwas not aware of all the primitive propositions
in ϕ, then we use the relation T to talk about corresponding
states. T1–T3 describe the key properties of the T relation.
T1 says that, in M∗, each state t∗ is an f -replacement of
some state t in S. T2 ensures that the distinguished state
s∗ comes from s and, agrees with s as far as the language
and truth of primitive propositions goes (since it is an id-
replacement of s); moreover, i’s awareness changes appro-
priately (since i becomes aware of ϕ).
The most interesting requirement is T3, which captures
how i’s beliefs change in states in K∗i (s
∗). Notice that,
by T2 and the constraints on awareness sets, A∗i (t
∗) =
Ai(s) ∪ PROP(ϕ) for all states that i considers possible at
s∗. Thus, i’s awareness must be updated by adding the new
propositions in ϕ, and he knows this has occurred. There are
no further constraints if PRi(s)(CONS(M,ϕ, i)) = 0; we
have nothing to say about how i’s beliefs change if i ascribes
probability 0 at state s to the possibility of becoming aware
of the new primitive propositions in ϕ.
If i ascribed positive probability to CONS(M,ϕ, i), then
each state t′ ∈ Ki(s)∩ CONS(M,ϕ, i) corresponds to some
states t† in Ki(s∗); each such state t† is a possible replace-
ment of t, for some f ∈ RS(ϕ, i, s), so f is compatible with
i becoming aware of ϕ at s.
The probability of this set of replacements of t′, which
we denote rep(t′), according to PR∗i (t
∗) (which is the
same as PR∗i (s
∗)) is exactly the probability of t′ accord-
ing to PRi(s), conditional on CONS(M, i, ϕ). Thus, i’s
beliefs about propositions he becomes aware of depend on
his interpretation of the shadow propositions. This updat-
ing rule is explored in a probability theoretic setting by
(Piermont 2019), where the primitive is a prior and a pos-
terior measure, PRi and PR
∗
i , and where PR
∗
i can be
defined over a possibly richer algebra of events. Piermont
provides conditions on this pair of measures that suffice to
ensure that they arise via an updating rule as given by T3(c).
The following example explores the mechanics of the sin-
gle agent transition rule and is presented diagrammatically
in Figure 1.
Example 2. Consider an agent i who is uncertain how to
interpret a novel proposition. Let M be the initial model
with a state space S = {s, t}, where L(s) = {p} and
L(t) = {q, q′}. Think of p as a real proposition and q and
q′ as shadow propositions. In s, p is true, and in t, q is true
and q′ false. The agent is unaware of p and considers only
t possible: Ai(s) = Ai(t) = ∅ and Ki(s) = Ki(t) = {t}.
Obviously, the agent places probability 1 on t.
For some α ∈ [0, 1], consider the transition rule τα such
that τα((M, s), p, i) = (M∗, s∗). M∗ has the state space
S∗ = {s∗, t∗, t†}. Let f be the p-replacement scheme given
by f : p 7→ q and let f ′ be the p-replacement scheme given
by f ′ : p 7→ q′. Then T = {(s, s∗, id), (t, t∗, f), (t, t†, f ′)}.
In all states, i’s awareness is exactly p, and in all states, she
considers both t∗ t† possible, that is, Ki(s∗) = Ki(t∗) =
Ki(t†) = {t∗, t†}. Finally, i puts probability α on state t∗
and (1−α) on state t†. When α = 1, i is sure that the novel
proposition p is what she was representing by the shadow
proposition q, and when α = 0 she is sure it was represented
by q′. In between, the agent is uncertain about the interpre-
tation of the novel proposition. Notice this uncertainty is not
captured inM , as the agent is unaware of p inM , hence can
not directly reason about its likelihood of being represented
by q or q′.
3.2 Dynamics: The Multiagent Case
In this section, we present a transition rule for multiagent
models. We assume that other agents do not realize that i
has become aware, so their beliefs remain invariant under
the model transition. Although this is conceptually simple, it
complicates the definition of an acceptable rule because the
updated model must contain additional states to handle other
agents’ beliefs. For example, if there are two agents, and j
initially (correctly) believes i is unaware of p, then after i be-
comes aware of p, j must consider a state where i is unaware
of p, even though he no longer is. Furthermore, since j still
believes i is unaware of p, the worlds that i considers from
the worlds that j considers (i.e., Ki(Kj(s))) cannot contain
p in language, requiring yet more states to be added.
The following definition generalizes Definition 2 to mod-
els with multiple agents.
Definition 3. τ : S (I,Φ)×L∀,X,ℓ,An (Φ)× I → S (I,Φ)
is an acceptable transition rule if for all (M, s) ∈ S (I,Φ),
ϕ ∈ L∀,X,ℓ,An (Φ), and i ∈ I, if PROP(ϕ) ∈ L(s), M =
(S, π,K1, . . . ,Kn,A1, . . . ,An,PR1, . . . ,PRn,L),
τ((M, s), ϕ, i) = (M∗, s∗), and M∗ =
(S∗, π∗,K∗1 , . . . ,K
∗
n,A
∗
1, . . . ,A
∗
n,PR
∗
1, . . . ,PR
∗
n,L
∗),
then either PROP(ϕ) ⊆ Ai(s) and (M, s) = (M∗, s∗),
or PROP(ϕ) 6⊆ Ai(s) and there exists a relation
T ⊆ S × S∗ × RS(ϕ) such that the following hold:
T1. For all t∗ ∈ S∗, there exists a unique t ∈ S and f such
that (t, t∗, f) ∈ T ; moreover, t∗ is an f -replacement of t.
T2. (s, s∗, id) ∈ T , A∗i (s
∗) = Ai(s) ∪ PROP(ϕ), and
A∗j (s
∗) = Aj(s) for j 6= i.
T3. If (t, t∗, f) ∈ T , t ∈ Ki(s) ∪ {s}, either f 6= id or
(t∗, f) = (s∗, id), and PRi(s)(CONS(M,ϕ, i)) 6= 0,
then the following conditions hold:
(a) K∗i (t
∗) = {t† : (t′, t†, f ′) ∈ T, for some t′ ∈
Ki(s) ∩ CONS(M,ϕ, i), f ′ ∈ RS(ϕ, i, s)}.
(b) If t′ ∈ Ki(s) ∩ CONS(M,ϕ, i), let
rep(t′) = {t† ∈ K∗i (t
′) : ∃f ′((t′, t†, f ′) ∈
T )}. Then PR∗i (t
∗)(rep(t′)) =
PRi(s)(t
′)/PRi(s)(CONS(M,ϕ, i)).
(c) f(Aj(t
∗)) = Aj(t) for all j 6= i.
T4. If (t, t∗, f) ∈ T , then the following hold for all agents
j 6= i, and for j = i if t /∈ Ki(s) ∪ {s} or if f = id and
t∗ 6= s∗:
(a) f(Aj(t∗)) = Aj(t).
(b) For all t′ ∈ Kj(t), there exists t† 6= s∗ such that
(t′, t†, f) ∈ T , and K∗j (t
∗) = {t† : (t′, t†, f) ∈
T for some t′ ∈ Kj(t), t† 6= s∗}.
(c) PR
∗
j (t
∗)(rep(t′) ∩ Ki(t∗)) = PRj(s)(t′).
pAi = ∅
s
q,¬q′
Ai = ∅
	
t
p,¬q′
Ai = {p}
	
t∗
q,¬p
Ai = {p}
	
t†
p
Ai = {p}
s∗
1
f
f ′
Id
Figure 1: A visual representation of Example 2. The states on the left are the initial state space, M , and those on the right are M∗. The red,
unlabeled arrows indicate i’s accessibility relation. The gray arrows indicate the relation T , labeled according to the replacement scheme.
T1 and T2 are the same as in Definition 2 with the caveat
that the awareness of agents other than i does not change. T3
is largely the same as before, except that it adds a require-
ment handling the awareness of other agents and it does not
apply to all states. For a state t† that corresponds to t′ via f ,
the awareness of each agent j 6= i changes according to f ;
if i becomes aware of p, then i replaces f(p) with p, so if j
was aware of f(p) in t′, then j must be aware of p in t†—p
replaces f(p) in Aj(t
∗).
The reason T3 no longer applies to all states is we need
to allow other agents to maintain their beliefs. Note that
states t† for which (t′, t†, id) ∈ T are not in Ki(s∗), since
id /∈ RS(ϕ, i, s) if there propositions that i is not aware of
in ϕ and thus are not under the scope of T3. This is be-
cause PROP(ϕ) ⊆ Φ, which is disjoint from Φ′, so we can-
not have id(PROP(ϕ)−Ai(s)) ⊆ Φ′. We use states t† where
(t′, t†, id) ∈ T and t′ ∈ Ki(s) to capture other agents’ be-
liefs about i.
Finally, T4 describes agents’ beliefs and awareness except
for i’s belief and awareness in states in Ki(s∗). Because
other agents do not know about i’s increased awareness, T4
also handles the construction of i’s beliefs and awareness in
states that are considered possible by other agents. Roughly
speaking, T4 says that if (t, t∗, f) ∈ T , then each agent’s
awareness changes according to f . The states that j consid-
ers possible at a state that is an f -replacement of t are exactly
the f -replacements of Kj(t). So knowledge is unperturbed
except as required by replacing shadow propositions where
needed. The final condition of T4 mirrors this but for prob-
abilistic assessments.
Example 3. Consider what happens when agent i in the
model M from Example 1 becomes aware of p′ in state s1.
Let τ be a transition rule that maps (M, s1) to (M
∗, s∗1)with
states S∗ = {s∗1, s
∗
2i, s
∗
1j , s
∗
2j, s
∗
3j , s
∗
2ij , s
∗
3ij , s
∗
1ij}. Letting
f denote the p′-replacement that maps p′ to q, T consists of
(s1, s
∗
1, id), (s2, s
∗
2i, f), and (sn, s
∗
nj , id) and (sn, s
∗
nij , f)}
for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The awareness functions in M∗ are defined as follows:
A∗i (s
∗
1) = A
∗
j (s
∗
1) = A
∗
i (s
∗
2i) = A
∗
j (s
∗
2i) = A
∗
j (s
∗
2j) =
{p, p′} and A∗i (s
∗
2j) = A
∗
i (s
∗
3) = A
∗
j (s
∗
3) = {p}.
The reachability functions in M∗ are defined as follows:
K∗i (s
∗
1) = K
∗
i (s
∗
2i) = {s
∗
2i}; K
∗
j (s
∗
1) = K
∗
j (s
∗
2i) =
K∗j (s
∗
2j) = {s
∗
2j}; K
∗
i (s
∗
2j) = K
∗
i (s
∗
3) = {s
∗
2j , s
∗
3}; and
K∗j (s
∗
3) = {s
∗
3}.
At s∗1, i believes that he is fully aware and also knows that
p is true. This is because he has disregarded the possibil-
ity of s3, since s3 /∈ CONS(p′, i). Thus, despite fact that i
only became aware of p′, and did not directly learn the truth
of any proposition, he has implicitly learned that p holds.
Moreover, notice that j believes i is unaware of p′.
The transition rule in Example 3, as opposed to that in
Example 2, adds many more states. This is because when
agent i becomes aware of p′, agent j does not know this
happened. Thus, we need a set of states that represent j’s
(now incorrect) beliefs that i is unaware of p′: these are the
states s∗1j , s
∗
2j , and s
∗
3j . In addition, i knows that j does not
know she became aware of p′. So we also have to add more
states to capture i’s correct beliefs about j’s incorrect beliefs
about i’s awareness; these are the states s∗1ij , s
∗
2ij , and s
∗
3ij .
3.3 Dynamics: Syntax and Axioms
In this section we briefly explore an extension of the lan-
guage presented in Section 2 that allows us to capture the
dynamic aspects of our transition rule. We then present some
axioms which we hope will help convey the requirements of
a valid transition rule more directly. While these axioms
are all sound, getting a complete axiomatization seems to
require more effort. We are currently exploring this.
Given that we are interested in what happens after an
agent becomes of a formula, it seems reasonable to con-
sider extending the language by adding formulas of the form
[ϕ, i]ψ to the underlying language L∀,X,ℓ,An considered in
this paper, where [ϕ, i]ψ is interpreted as “after i becomes
aware of ϕ, ψ is true.” Such a formula is interpreted relative
to a probabiistic awarness structureM and a transition rule
τ in the obvious way:
(M, s, τ) |= [ϕ, i]ψ if ((τ((M, s), ϕ, i), τ) |= ψ.
Note that this definition allows for occurrences of formulas
of the form [ϕ′, j]ψ′ in ψ (although not in ϕ).
In this language, we can capture many of the properties
of the transition function τ . For example, the following two
axioms are sound:
p, q
Ai = {p}
Aj = {p, q}
	
s2
p, p′
Ai = {p, p
′}
Aj = {p, p
′}
	
s∗
2i
¬p
Ai = {p}
Aj = {p}
	
s3
p, p′
Ai = {p}
Aj = {p, p
′}
s1
p, p′
Ai = {p, p
′}
Aj = {p, p
′}
s∗
1
id
s∗
3j
	
s∗
2j
	
s∗
1j
f
s∗
3ij
	
s∗
2ij
	
s∗
1ij
f
Id
Figure 2: A visual representation of Example 3. The red arrows indicate i’s accessibility relation; the blue (dotted) arrows indicate j’s
accessibility relation. The gray arrows indicate the relation T , labeled according to the replacement scheme. The two sets of three states
on the right side of the figure are both copies of the original three states, under different replacement schemes; the upper three states are
f -replacements and the lower three are id-replacements.
A∗. Aiψ ⇔ [ϕ, i]Ai(ϕ ∧ ψ) if PROP(ψ) ∩ PROP(ϕ) = ∅.
AK. Kjψ ∧ Ajψ ⇔ [ϕ, i](Kjψ ∧ [ϕ, i]Ajψ).
A∗ states that after becoming aware of ϕ agent i is aware of
ϕ and everything that he was initially aware of. AKo states
that the knowledge and awareness of other agents remains
invariant.
To capture how an agent’s beliefs changes as a result of
an update, we need to be able to talk about consistency. Let
Consis(ϕ, i) be a new formula that is true at a state t if t
is consistent with i becoming aware of ϕ. If PROP(ϕ) has
no primitive propositions, then Consis(ϕ, i) is equivalent to
true, and if |PROP(ϕ)| = 1, then Consis(ϕ, i) is equivalent
to ∃x¬Ai(x). But if |PROP(ϕ)| > 1, then it can be shown
that Consis(ϕ, i) is not equivalent to a formula in L∀,X,ℓ,An .
UsingConsis(ϕ, i), we can provide some sound axioms that
capture how an agent’s beliefs change:
Ka. (ℓi(Consis(i, ϕ) > 0) ∧ Ki(Consis(i, ϕ) ⇒ ψ)) ⇒
[ϕ, i]Kiψ.
Kb. (ℓi(Consis(i, ϕ) > 0 ∧ [ϕ, i]Kiψ[x/ψ′]) ⇒
Ki(Consis(ϕ, i)⇒ ∃xψ).
Pra. ℓi(ψ ∧ Consis(ϕ, i)) > αℓi(Consis(ϕ, i)) ⇒
[ϕ, i](ℓi(ψ) > α).
Prb. (ℓi(Consis(i, ϕ) > 0 ∧ [ϕ, i](ℓiψ[x/ϕ]) > α) ⇒
ℓi(∃xψ ∧Consis(ϕ, i)) > αℓi(Consis(ϕ, i)).
Ka states that after becoming aware of ϕ, i knows every-
thing he knew before he was aware of ϕ that was consistent
with becoming aware of ϕ, provided that becoming aware
of ϕ has positive probability. Kb is almost a converse. It
says that if after becoming aware of ϕ i knows ψ, then
before becoming aware, i knew that ψ (with occurrences
of ϕ replaced by an existential) held in all states where it
was consistent for i to become aware of ϕ. Pra and Prb
are analogues of Ka and Kb for probability formulas. Note
that ℓi(ψ ∧ Consis(ϕ, i)) > αℓi(Consis(ϕ, i)) essentially
says that the probaiblity of ψ conditional on Consis(ϕ, i) is
greater than α. Since we do not have conditional probability
formulas in the language, we cannot say this directly.
4 Information Disclosure
The following section is a simple application of our model
to the problem of information disclosure. In the interest of
space and simplicity, we consider a highly stylized setting:
There are two agents, a buyer and a seller (we can think of
the seller as a restaurateur and the buyer as a potential pa-
tron). The agents’ belief and awareness will be modeled via
a probabilistic awareness structure for 2 agents along with a
transition rule. We can think of the agents as playing a game
(i.e., they have actions and payoffs associated with these ac-
tions), but the game is not described explicitly in the epis-
temic model.
The initial state space (i.e., before the buyer become
aware of a formula of which he was previously unaware) is
{smn , t
m
n }(n,m)∈{1,...,N}×{1,...,M}. The lower index (n) rep-
resents the type or quality of the seller. So in state smn or t
m
n ,
the seller has quality n; we assume that the buyer’s value
for a purchase is increasing in n (i.e., the buyer gets better-
quality meals, which he values more highly, at a better-
quality restaurant). The upper index (m) represents the
buyer’s type: how the buyer reacts to becoming aware of
new features (explained in detail shortly).
The s states (i.e., states of the form smn for some n andm)
are “real” in the sense that they contain no shadow proposi-
tions. The seller, who we assume is fully aware, considers
only s states possible. The t states represent the buyer’s un-
derstanding of the world, containing shadow propositions in
place of the real propositions that he is unaware of but exist
in the s states. We assume that (it is commonly known that)
the seller knows his type n but not how the buyer will react
to information, so Ks(smn ) ⊆ {s
m′
n : m
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}}.
On the other hand, (it is commonly known that) the buyer
knows how he will react to information, but does not know
the seller’s type, so Kb(smn ) = Kb(t
m
n ) = {t
m
n′ : n
′ ∈
{1, . . . , N}}.
A list of propositions {p1, . . . , pK} is a rating structure,
and the pk’s are called ratings, if (1) exactly one propo-
sition pk is true at each state s
m
n and (2) if pk is true at
smn , pk′ is true at s
m′
n′ , and k > k
′, then n > n′. Thus,
higher ratings indicate higher-quality sellers. Note that this
condition implies that the same rating must hold at smn and
sm
′
n : the seller knows the rating. In general, a rating may
be true at more than one state; a rating p is perfectly in-
formative if there is exactly one n such that p is true of
only states of the form smn . We assume that the seller is
aware of the rating, but the buyer is not. Formally, we
assume a particular rating structure, given by p1, . . . , pK ,
such that the seller is aware of p1, . . . , pK at all states of
the form smn . The buyer is not aware of these formulas at
any state. In some states of the form tnm there is no rating
structure in the language (these are the states where it does
not occur to the buyer that there is a rating structure). In
other states there of the form tmn , there are one or more rat-
ing structures, but these are represented by shadow propo-
sitions x1, . . . , xK′ ; the buyer is not aware of these shadow
propositions, but understands that the seller knows the ac-
tual rating structure (so, in these states, formulas of the form
¬Ab(xj)∧As(xj)∧ (Ks(xj)∨Ks(¬xj) hold). We assume
that the superscript m in tmn indicates which rating struc-
tures are in the language at tmn , so if {x1, . . . , xK} is a rating
structure and {x1, . . . , xK} ⊆ L(tmn ), then {x1 . . . xK} ⊆
L(tmn′) for all n
′.
The seller sets a price and possibly discloses his rating;
the buyer then decides whether to buy (i.e., whether to eat
at the restaurant). Before deciding, the buyer updates his
beliefs based on whatever information the seller discloses
and his beliefs about the seller’s. If the buyer was unaware of
pk and pk is disclosed, then the buyer first updates his beliefs
according to the transition rule to become aware of pk, then
he conditions on the fact that pk is true. Among other things,
the index m captures how the buyer will update when she
becomes aware of a rating (i.e., it encodes a replacement
function). An equilibrium of this game consists of (1) an
action for each type of seller, and (2) beliefs and an action for
the buyer, for each action of the seller, where (1) and (2) are
such that both parties are maximizing (the expected revenue
and the expected value of the purchase, respectively).
As we observed in the introduction, if the buyer is aware
of the rating structure, then all sellers (except possibly those
with the lowest rating) will reveal their rating. On the
other hand, if the buyer is unaware of the rating structure
{p1, . . . , pK}, we must explicitly indicate how he would
treat the lack of revelation. This is the role of the buyer’s
type. We assume here that when no rating is revealed, the
buyer’s beliefs do not change at all: the buyer continues
to be unaware of the rating. But note that this is funda-
mentally different from the buyer knowing that the rating
could have been disclosed but was not. Under this assump-
tion, the unraveling argument given in the introduction fails:
any type with a rating imparting lower-than-average quality
would prefer the buyer to retain his original belief; not dis-
closing does not have any effect on these beliefs, since the
buyer’s unawareness prevents him from reasoning about the
actions of other types.
Given the immediate failure of the unraveling argument,
the more interesting aspect of this model is the dependency
of the seller’s beliefs on the transition rule, as encoded by
the m index. The key point is that smn and s
m′
n are distin-
guished by the buyer’s reaction to becoming aware of a new
rating. We provide an example showing how the seller’s be-
liefs about the transition rule determine whether the seller
decides to disclose his rating.
Suppose that N = 3, so that there are three qualities of
seller (restaurant) and M = 2. Suppose that the buyer’s
utility for a purchase if the restaurant has quality n is n, and
that at smn , the buyer initially believes that t
m
1 , t
m
2 , and t
m
3
have probability 12 ,
1
4 , and
1
4 , respectively. This indicates
that in the absence of any signal, when the buyer does not
update his beliefs at all, his expected utility is 1 × 12 + 2 ×
1
4 + 3×
1
4 =
7
4 .
Suppose that the rating pn is true at state s
m
n , for n =
1, 2, 3, so pn is perfectly informative;L(smn ) = {p1, p2, p3}.
We take L(tnm) = {x1, x2, x3, y1}, where these are all
shadow ratings. Think of xn as the shadow signal corre-
sponding to pn, so that xn is true only at the states t
m
n for
n = 1, 2, 3. The shadow rating y1 is a coarsening of x1 and
x2; it is true at both t
m
1 and t
m
2 .
The transition rule is such that, if the buyer becomes
aware of pn, the situation (M, s
m
n ) is mapped to the situ-
ation (M∗n, s
m∗
n ) with relation Tn containing (t
1
n′ , t
1∗
n′ , f
1
n)
and (t2n′ , t
2∗
n′ , f
2
n) for n
′ ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where the replace-
ments are given by f1n : pn 7→ xn for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and
f21 : p1 7→ y1, f
2
2 : p2 7→ y1, and f
2
3 : p3 7→ x3. That
is, in states of the form t1n, the buyer interprets pk as aris-
ing from the perfectly informative shadow rating structure
{x1, x2, x3}, and in states t2n, he interprets it as arising from
the coarser shadow rating structure {y1, x3}, conflating p1
and p2.
As always, the highest type, a seller in state sm3 , will dis-
close regardless of his beliefs about the transition rule. Con-
versely, a seller in state sm1 never has a reason to disclose.
However, a seller in state sm2 will disclose only when he is
sufficiently confident the seller will correctly interpret p2 as
being perfectly informative. In state s12, disclosing imparts
beliefs (in the updated model) that places probability 1 on
state t12, and a willingness to pay of 2 >
7
4 . Thus, if he knew
that he was in state s12, he would certainly want to disclose
p2. If, however, he knew he was in state s
2
2, disclosing im-
parts a beliefs (in the updated model) that places probability
2
3 on state t
1
1 and
1
3 on state t
1
2, and a willingness to pay of
4
3 <
7
4 .
5 Discussion
This paper develops a modal logic that allows agents to rea-
son both about probabilities and about their own and others’
awareness. We introduce the semantic notion of a model
transition, which captures how a model changes when an
agent becomes aware of a new formula. In contrast to prior
work on the subject, our transition rule allows the relative
likelihood of two formulas that an agent was aware of to
change arbitrarily after she becomes more aware. This is
because the agent can, to some extent, reason about her own
unawareness. If, for example, after becoming aware of ϕ she
believes that having been unaware of ϕ was correlated with
the truth of some other formula ψ, then her probabilistic as-
sessment of ψ can change.
We then apply this model to a simple economic environ-
ment of information disclosure, where one agent can strate-
gically decide to make another agent aware of a new for-
mula. We show that the agent’s beliefs about how others will
react to novel information (i.e., her beliefs about the model
transition rule) determine her decision to disclose informa-
tion and expand the awareness of other agents.
In future work, we hope to explore further applications
of dynamic awareness. We believe that thinking about how
awareness changes will prove critical in understanding eco-
nomic puzzles and the general problem of updating in the
presence of unawareness. We would also hope to provide a
sound and complete axiomatic characterization of our tran-
sition rule, in the spirit of the discussion in Section 3.3.
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